Civil Rights Removal After Rachel and Peacock: A Limited Federal Remedy by Editors,
CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL AFTER RACHEL AND
PEACOCK: A LIMITED FEDERAL REMEDY
Congressional protection of civil rights has taken both substantive
and procedural form.' One major procedural guarantee, first enacted in
the post Civil War period,2 permits removal of state criminal prosecu-
tions3 to the federal courts under certain circumstances. Early Supreme
Court decisions restricted the applicability of this civil rights removal
provision to the situation where a facially unconstitutional state statute
is involved." In the early 1960's the lower federal courts began to
reconsider and expand the scope of this removal provision, 5 and in
1966 the Supreme Court, at the invitation of Congress,6 reexamined
it for the first time in sixty years.' The Court's decisions in Georgia v.
Rachel8 and City of Greenwood v. Peacock9 deviated somewhat from
the early line of cases but rejected major expansion of what is now
section 1443 of title 28. The petitioners in Rachel and Peacock were
black persons who had exercised their civil rights, and white persons
aiding them in that pursuit, who claimed that the various state criminal
charges against them had no basis in fact, that the arrests and prosecu-
tions were racially motivated, and that as a result they could not receive
fair trials in a state court.1 In holding removal to be proper in Rachel
but requiring remand to the state court in Peacock, the Court added
to the "exquisite obscurity"'" of the statute.
1 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970), with 28 id. § 1443.
2 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970), the present civil rights removal statute, applies to both
civil and criminal cases. This Comment deals only with criminal cases since they have
been primarily responsible for the litigation concerning this statute.
4 E.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); see notes 30-35 infra & accompanying
text.
5 See Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S.
808 (1966) ; Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
But see Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), affd mem., 384 U.S. 890
(1966).
6 In § 901 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970), Congress
provided that "an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed
pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise." The
legislative history indicates that Congress intended that the federal appellate courts
should reconsider the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970), the civil rights removal statute.
See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2770, 2773 (1964) (remarks of Representative Kastenmeler);
id. 6564 (remarks of Senator Kuchel); id. 6955-56 (remarks of Senator Dodd).
7The most recent case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the civil rights
removal provision had been Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
8384 U.S. 780 (1966).
9 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
10See text accompanying notes 39-41, 57-61 infra.
"lAmsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 793, 843 (1965).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Removal of a criminal prosecution from state court pursuant to
section 1443 should be, in theory, a relatively simple and certain pro-
cedure for gaining access to a federal forum. A removal petition filed
in federal district court prior to the commencement of the criminal trial
automatically terminates all state proceedings unless and until the
case is remanded to the state court.' 2 In ordering a remand in Peacock
the Supreme Court suggested that the petitioners had several alternative
means of protecting their rights: a federal injunction against the state
prosecution,13 appeal to the Supreme Court from a state conviction,14
or federal habeas corpus after conviction.' 5 However, to the criminal
defendant in state court, removal possesses significant advantages over
each of these alternatives.' 6 The filing of a claim for injunctive relief,
unlike a removal petition, does not automatically halt the state prosecu-
tion. Furthermore, federal injunctions against state prosecutions are
not easily obtainable since Younger v. Harris.17 Appeal to the Supreme
Court is an uncertain remedy because of the delay, the small number
of state convictions which the Court reviews, and the absence of
factual determinations made in a federal forum. Habeas only sometimes
provides a federal factfinder, 8 and even when a hearing is provided
the district court's finding is made against a background of a previous
state determination of the facts. In addition, many cases will have
become moot before the federal habeas stage due to the relative brevity
of the prison sentences attached to most of the offenses for which indi-
viduals being harassed for the exercise of their civil rights are usually
convicted.
The civil rights removal statute reads:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecu-
tions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the
defendant to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce
in the courts of such State a right under any law
providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdic-
tion thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from
12 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1970). See South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1072-74
(4th Cir. 1971).
13384 U.S. at 829 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)).
14 1d. (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), and Thompson v.
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)).
151d. (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963)).
16See generally Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 794-99.
17401 U.S. 37 (1971).
18 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing
to do any act on the ground it would be inconsistent
with such law. 9
In Peacock the Court concluded that subsection two protected only
federal officers and those persons acting directly under their authority °
That decision drastically limits the usefulness and significance of section
1443 (2). Therefore this Comment will limit its discussion to the prob-
lems raised by section 1443 (1), examining Rachel, Peacock, and the
more recent opinions of the courts of appeals, in an attempt to determine
what facts must be proven for removal to be sustained, and thus what
facts must be alleged in order for the federal district court to hold an
evidentiary hearing rather than remanding on the basis of the pleadings.
Put briefly and in the language of the statute, this Comment will ex-
amine what circumstances must be present prior to state trial to justify
a determination that a defendant will be "denied or cannot enforce" in
state court those federal rights protected by the removal statute. Be-
fore examining the cases it will be helpful to consider the legislative
ancestry and early judicial history of civil rights removal in order to
appreciate the task that faced the Supreme Court in 1966 and that
continues to confront the lower federal courts.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE EARLY DEcIsIONS
The forerunner of the present civil rights removal statute was
originally enacted in the third section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.21
It provided for removal by defendants in state court "who are denied or
cannot enforce" in the state courts any of the rights explicitly guar-
anteed them by the first section of that act.22 Thus there was no
uncertainty as to which federal rights, when denied, provided a sufficient
ground for removal. The ambiguous phrase, "any law providing for the
1928 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
20 384 U.S. at 814-24.
2 1 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
The Thirty-ninth Congress passed the 1866 Civil Rights Act with the purpose of
giving the freedmen the full measure of those rights secured by the Emancipation
Proclamation and the thirteenth amendment. At least in part, the statute and especially
the provision for removal in the third section was designed to counteract the Black
Codes which were enacted in the Southern States during Reconstruction. See Amsterdam,
supra note 11, at 814-18.
For a history of criminal removal prior to the Civil War, see Amsterdam, supra
note 11, at 806-10. For a discussion of removal jurisdiction generally, see H. M. HART
& H. WzcusLER, Tnm FEDERAa, CoURTs ND T=E FEDzAL Sys=M 1019-51 (1953).
22The first section of the act provided:
[United States] citizens, of every race and color without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right...
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property ... as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Substantially the same substantive rights
are now codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970).
1972]
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equal civil rights of citizens of the United States," defining the scope
of civil rights removal jurisdiction, first appeared in the Revised Statutes
of 1875 when Congress codified the substantive and removal provisions
of the 1866 Act in separate sections.2" This codification resulted in
uncertainty concerning which federal rights were to receive the spe-
cial protection of the removal provision.'
Similarly, problems with interpreting the phrase rights "denied or
cannot enforce" did not really arise until after 1875. The 1866 Act
had declared that removal procedures would follow those of the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, which authorized removal either before
or after trial in the state court.25 At least with regard to post-trial
removal the district court was not placed in a position of having to
predict the behavior of the state court in order to determine whether
a defendant would be denied or unable to enforce a particular right
in that court; it could look to the trial to determine whether rights
had been denied.26 However, in 1875 Congress eliminated post-trial
removal,27 leaving it to the Supreme Court to determine the scope of
pre-trial removal under the remaining provisions.
Originally the Supreme Court was denied the opportunity to deter-
mine the limits of pre-trial removal because an order to remand to the
state courts was considered to be a non-final order and thus not subject
to appeal.28 This bar was lifted in 1875 when Congress passed a statute
making a remand order reviewable on appeal. 9 In a series of decisions
referred to as the Strauder-Powers cases, 0 the Court interpreted the
removal provision narrowly, allowing removal before trial only when
the defendant could point to a state statute or constitutional provision
discriminatory on its face!' The first two decisions in this line set
23 The substantive guarantees contained in § 1 were codified in REv. STAT. §§ 1977-78
(1875), presently 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970), and the removal provisions of § 3 were
codified in REEV. STAT. § 641 (1875), presently 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
24 See New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977
(1965) (discussing § 1443(2)); Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 863-74; Note, Federal
Jurisdiction: The Civil Rights Removal Statute Revisited, 1967 Dux. L. Rav. 136,
151-71.
25 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 756, as
amended, Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 3, 14 Stat. 46.
26It would seem, however, that even with post-trial removal there is an element
of prediction, for permitting removal assumes that the federal right could not be vindi-
cated through an appeal within the state court system.
2 7 A removal petition could be filed "at any time before the trial or final hearing
of the cause." REv. STAT. § 641 (1875). See Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 843 n.201.
2 8 See Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullifi-
cation, 63 CoLiuh-. L. Rav. 1163, 1189-90 & n.108 (1963).
29 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472.
3 0 Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213
(1898); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592
(1896); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110
(1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
3 1 1n each of the cases in this line it was a state statute regulating trial procedure
that was found unconstitutional, requiring removal. Logic would, however, dictate the
same result when it is the state criminal statute underlying the prosecution that is
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the tone for those to follow. In Strauder v. West Virginia3 2 removal was
granted because an applicable state statute disqualified blacks from
sitting on grand or petit juries. But removal was denied in Virginia v.
Rives3" despite uncontradicted allegations that no black had ever
served on a county jury, because the petitioners could point to no
statutory or constitutional provisions of the state authorizing this prac-
tice. The Court reasoned that in the absence of such a discriminatory
statute a defendant could not predict with certainty that his equal
rights would be deniedY4
It is to be observed that that act gives the right of removal
only to a person "who is denied, or cannot enforce, in the judi-
cial tribunals of the State his equal civil rights." And this is to
appear before trial. When a statute of the State denies his
right, or interposes a bar to his enforcing it, in the judicial
tribunals, the presumption is fair that they will be controlled
by it in their decisions; and in such a case a defendant may
affirm on oath what is necessary for a removal 3 5
This approach had the practical virtue of providing a clear test which
did not require a federal judge to anticipate the conduct of a particular
state court.
In 1887 Congress repealed the legislation making remand orders
appealable,"3 and it was not until the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that Congress again made it possible for the Supreme Court
to interpret the scope of civil rights removal3 7 Section 901 of that Act
provided that cases removed under section 1443 were exempt from
the general statutory provisions making remand orders nonreviewable3
III. THE 1966 SUPREim COURT CASES
The issue before the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel 9 and
City of Greenwood v. Peacock40 was whether the district court should
have held a hearing on the allegations made in a section 1443 removal
unconstitutional. Facially unconstitutional statutes, whether substantive or procedural,
deny defendants federally guaranteed rights and can result in illegal convictions. See
Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 892. See also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800, 803
(1966) (discussing the early cases without drawing a distinction between substantive
and procedural statutes).
832 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
33 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
34 Id. at 320.
35 Id. at 321.
36Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 5S3.
3 7 But see Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 832-33 n.173. Although no immediate appeal
was possible, the Court could have considered the scope of civil rights removal jurisdic-
tion in an appeal from a state conviction in a case that a federal district court had
remanded following removal.
S8 See note 6 sup ra.
39384 U.S. 780 (1966).
40384 U.S. 808 (1966).
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petition. The defendants in Rachel were prosecuted under a Georgia
criminal trespass statute making it a misdemeanor to fail to leave
another person's premises after having been ordered to do so by the
owner or his agent.41 The removal petitions alleged that the defendants
had been seeking to obtain service at a restaurant and had refused the
proprietor's request that they leave the premises. In the removal petition
the defendants further alleged that their arrests and prosecutions "were
effected for the sole purpose of aiding, abetting, and perpetuating
customs . . . which exist within the City of Atlanta with respect to
serving and seating members of the Negro race in such places of public
accommodation and convenience upon a racially discriminatory ba-
sis .... ))42
The Court first concluded that the phrase, "any law providing for
... equal civil rights," was not meant to include only the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.4 Nor was the phrase limited to include only civil rights
statutes in effect in 1875, the date of the codification which first used
that phrase. Rather, said the Court, Congress intended to include all
statutes of a nature similar to that of the 1866 Act, including all such
statutes to be enacted in the future." In order to come within the scope
of the removal statute, a law must, according to Rachel, provide "for
specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality."" Under this
formulation the deprivation of first amendment or due process guar-
antees is insufficient to support removal since they are phrased gen-
erally and are available to all persons. 6 But the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was found to be a "law providing for.., equal civil rights" since
in section 201 (a) it guaranteed to every person the "full and equal
enjoyment . . . of any place of public accommodation . . . without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion,
or national origin.""
In the absence of a discriminatory state statute removal could not
have been granted under the Strauder-Powers decisions. The Court,
however, managed to expand the scope of section 1443 (1) without sig-
nificantly undercutting those cases. This was accomplished by em-
phasizing three words in the language of Virginia v. Rives:
In Rives itself, however, the Court noted that the denial
of which the removal provision speaks "is primarily, if not
41384 US. at 783 & n.1.
4 2 Id. at 783.
43Id. at 788-92.
44Id. at 792.
45d. See Note, supra note 24, at 151-71.
46 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966). The Court did not deal with the
status of the equal protection clause. The question is whether a constitutional provision is
a "law." See id. at 790 n.13.
47 Id. at 792-93 & n.20.
CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL
exclusively, a denial . . . resulting from the Constitution
or laws of the State .... " 100 U.S., at 319. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) . . . The Court thereby gave some indication that
removal might be justified, even in the absence of a discrimina-
tory state enactment, if an equivalent basis could be shown
for an equally firm prediction that the defendant would be
"denied or cannot enforce" the specified federal rights in the
state court.48
The Court said that it was able to make such a prediction in Rachel on
the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."9 Section 201(a) of that act
guaranteed to all persons the right of equal access to places of public
accommodation without regard to race or color. Furthermore, section
203 provided that "[n]o person shall . . . (c) punish or attempt to
punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or
privilege secured by section 201 or 202. That provision had been
interpreted in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill51 to prohibit not only the
conviction, but the very act of prosecution, of individuals for conduct
authorized by section 201.5" The Rachel defendants were being prose-
cuted under a Georgia trespass statute which made it a misdemeanor for
a person to refuse to leave another's premises upon the request of the
owner.53 Thus, if the removal petition's allegations were true, then
"the defendants refused to leave facilities of public accommodation,
when ordered to do so solely for racial reasons,"54 thereby making the
mere prosecution of the defendants for failure to obey that order a
denial of a right conferred by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 1964
Act, as interpreted in Hamm,"substitutes a right for a crime." 55
Hence, if as alleged in the present removal petition, the defen-
dants were asked to leave solely for racial reasons, then the
mere pendency of the prosecutions enables the federal court
to make the clear prediction that the defendants will be "de-
nied or cannot enforce in the courts of [the] State" the right
to be free of any "attempt to punish" them for the protected
activity. It is no answer in these circumstances that the defen-
48 Id. at 804.
40 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-03, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a to a-2 (1970). There is at least some legislative history indicating that Congress
intended such a result. See Note, supra note 24, at 160 n.122.
5042 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1970).
51379 U.S. 306 (1964).
52Id. at 311. From this discussion in Hamm it is not entirely clear that all prosecu-
tions, including unsuccessful ones, were prohibited. In Rachel, however, this possible
ambiguity was resolved; the Court read Hamm to prohibit the very act of prosecution.
384 U.S. at 794.
53 384 U.S. at 783 & n.1.
54 Id. at 804.
55 Harem v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 314 (1964), quoted in Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 805 (1966).
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dants might eventually prevail in the state court. The burden
of having to defend the prosecutions is itself the denial of a
right .... 5
The Court found that this type of firm prediction could not be
made in City of Greenwood v. Peacock. 7 Peacock consisted of two
separate cases. One set of petitioners was charged with the misdemeanor
of obstructing the public streets. They alleged that they were members
of a civil rights group engaged in a voter registration drive, and that the
arrests and prosecutions were racially motivated." The second group
of petitioners, also civil rights group members, had been charged with a
variety of offenses including assault, parading without a permit, reckless
driving, and profanity. 9 They alleged that their arrests and prosecutions
were for the "sole purpose and effect of harassing" them and that
"they had been denied and could not enforce.., rights under laws pro-
viding for equal civil rights . . . because of the commitment of the
courts and [law enforcement] officers to the State's declared policy of
racial segregation." 6° Additionally, they claimed that the trial would
take place in a segregated courtroom before judges and prosecutors
who had gained office in elections from which Negro voters had been
excluded, and that Negroes would also be excluded from the juriesp'
Denying removal, Justice Stewart found an "immediately appar-
ent" difference between this case and Rachel:
In Rachel the defendants relied on the specific provisions of
a preemptive federal civil rights law.., that, under the condi-
tions alleged, gave them: (1) the federal statutory right to
remain on the property of a restaurant proprietor after being
ordered to leave, despite a state law making it a criminal
offense not to leave, and (2) the further federal statutory right
that no State should even attempt to prosecute them for their
conduct. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 as construed in Hamm
thus specifically and uniquely conferred upon the defendants
an absolute right to 'violate' the explicit terms of the state
criminal trespass law with impunity under the conditions al-
leged in the Rachel removal petition, and any attempt by the
State to make them answer in a court for this conceded "vio-
lation" would directly deny their federal right "in the courts
of [the] State." The present case differs from Rachel in two
significant respects. First, no federal law confers an absolute
right on private citizens--on civil rights advocates, on Ne-
groes, or on anybody else-to obstruct a public street, to con-
56 384 U.S. at 805 (footnote omitted).
57384 U.S. 808 (1966).
58 Id. at 810-12 & n.3.
59 Id. at 813 & n.5.
60 1d. at 813 & n.6.
61 Id. at 813 n.6.
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tribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an automobile
without a license, or to bite a policeman. Second, no federal
law confers immunity from state prosecution on such
charges.62
This analysis fails to distinguish satisfactorily the two cases and has
created a morass for the lower federal courts. For although no statute
gives anyone the absolute right to bite a policeman, it is equally true
that no federal law confers an absolute right for anyone, including the
Rachel defendants, to trespass. The Rachel defendants had a right to
remain on the premises only if the order to leave was racially motivated
in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court ordered the
district court to hold a hearing on this question. The Peacock defen-
dants, if granted such a hearing, might also have been able to prove that
they were being prosecuted solely for the exercise of federally protected
activity. As will be discussed,"' sections 1971 (b) and 1973 (i) (b) could
provide the Peacock defendants with the same immunity from prose-
cution that resulted in the Rachel decision. Here, too, the very act of
prosecution could, under the removal petition's allegations, constitute
a denial of federally protected rights.
The unsatisfactory nature of the Court's opinions has forced the
lower federal courts to search for an unarticulated distinction between
Rachel and Peacock.4 Three basic questions have arisen in the cases
which have confronted the courts of appeals since 1966. First, what
wording is necessary in a federal statute providing for equal civil rights
before it is sufficient to confer immunity from prosecution as well as
conviction? Rachel relies on section 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which, under stated circumstances, prohibits an "attempt to pun-
ish." Some other civil rights statutes 5 within the meaning of section
1443 (1)'s "equal civil rights" requirement 6 protect individuals against
any "attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce" them because of their
exercise of rights conferred by that statute. Arguably, this language,
present in the voting rights bill relied upon by the petitioners in
Peacock does not provide the necessary prophylactic federal statute.
Unlike the term "punish," the phrase "intimidate, threaten, or coerce"
may not apply to prosecutions brought by the stateY01
Second, in passing upon a removal petition, should the federal dis-
trict judge look to the allegations in the removal petition, those of the
621d. at 826-27.
(33 Text accompanying notes 71-85 infra.
6 4 This is particularly important because after Rachel it is most unlikely that a case
will duplicate the Rachel facts, because state prosecutors can carefully choose the time
of arrest and the crime charged if they are trying to harass a civil rights worker. See
Frinks v. North Carolina, 468 F.2d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 1972) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(b), 1973i(b) (1970).
6 6 See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
1
7 See notes 71-79 infra & accompanying text.
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criminal charge or indictment, or both? In Rachel the Court accepted
the petitioners' allegations concerning the racial motivation of the
restaurant owner. But if the petitioners were being prosecuted for
assaulting the restaurant manager after refusing his order to leave,
and they alleged that no violence of any type had occurred, and that
they were being prosecuted solely for their failure to leave, the question
as to which set of allegations is determinative, becomes crucial. For
if the criminal charge is controlling, then no right established by the
Civil Rights Act of 1966 would appear to be violated by the very act
of prosecution, and remand to the state court without a hearing would
be appropriate.
The third question only arises if it is decided that the federal dis-
trict judge should look, at least in part, to the allegations in the removal
petition. What type of causal connection must be alleged in a removal
petition to link the prosecution and the civil rights activity which alleg-
edly gives rise to that prosecution? If, for example, a defendant alleges
that his prosecution for reckless driving is solely motivated by his civil
rights activity earlier that day, should a factual hearing be held? Should
it matter that the civil rights activity took place three weeks before the
arrest? Should murder or larceny charges be treated differently than
reckless driving or vagrancy?
These questions will first be analyzed in the context of the at-
tempts by the courts of appeals to deal with Rachel and Peacock.
IV. Rachel AND Peacock DISTINGUISHED IN
THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court reached divergent results in Rachel and Pea-
cock without making clear which case established the general principle
and which merely the exception8 This ambiguity has become manifest
in the removal decisions in the courts of appeals, where the practice has
been to rely upon Rachel and explain away Peacock when granting re-
moval and to follow the reverse procedure when ordering remand to
the state trial court. In at least one decision the court relied on Peacock
without even mentioning Rachel.69 At least four different analyses have
been offered to explain the Supreme Court's decisions.
68 Regarding Rachel, the Fifth Circuit has said: "It has always been the position
of the court that unless the Supreme Court expressly limits its opinion to the facts
before it, it is the principle which controls and not the specific facts upon which the
principle was decided." Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1969). However, this
same court of appeals has read Peacock, also not limited to its facts by the Supreme
Court, to have been decided upon a particular factual issue not even expressly mentioned
in the Court's opinion. See text accompanying notes 80-81 infra.
Judge Godbold, speaking of a plaintiff whose arrest he deemed a "flagrant wrong"
on a "baseless" vagrancy charge, stated without providing any reasons: "Factually [the
petitioner) is somewhere between [Rachel] and [Peacock]. But her case is removable
only if it is within Rachel." Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468, 475-76 (5th Cir.
1968) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6 9 Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Judge Sobeloff has interpreted Rachel and Peacock in a manner
which would limit removal to cases in which the petitioner invoked sec-
tion 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 196470 in support of his removal
petition.7 The Peacock defendants had based their removal petition on
section 1971(b), which declares:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise,
shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of inter-
fering with the right of such other person to vote .... 72
Judge Sobeloff relied on this language in distinguishing Rachel and
Peacock. Under his analysis the Peacock Court's statement that "no
federal law confers immunity from state prosecution" was based on the
failure of section 1971 (b) to specifically prohibit actions which "punish
or attempt to punish."73 Under this approach civil rights workers in-
volved in protecting the right to public accommodations would have
access to the federal courts but those attempting to vote or to register
others to vote7' would not. Judge Sobeloff felt bound by what he con-
sidered the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1971(b) despite
his belief that its language "is a more, not less, sweeping prohibition of
official acts of harassment against equal civil rights than the limited
proscription of § 203 (c), since 'attempts to punish' are only one means
of coercing, threatening, or intimidating.' 75 His interpretation of Pea-
cock assumes that the Court's statement regarding the lack of a fed-
eral right is based on the inherent failing of that statute rather than
on its failure to protect the conduct charged by the state. He ignores
the last three words of the sentence he quotes. Justice Stewart's full
sentence was: "Second, no federal law confers immunity from state
prosecution on such charges."76 It is difficult to believe that the Court
7042 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1970).
71 Frinks v. North Carolina, 468 F.2d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion);
North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559, 560 (4th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
7242 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1970).
73 Frinks v. North Carolina, 468 F.2d 639, 646 (4th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion);
North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559, 562-63 (4th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
Originally the Second Circuit, in dictum by judge Friendly, rejected this analysis.
New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir.), cerL. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969)
(hypothetical removal case under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970)). In a more recent opinion,
however, the court, in another opinion by Judge Friendly, indicated that it was no
longer certain that judge Sobeloff's analysis was incorrect, but under the circumstances
did not have to decide the issue. New York v. Horelick, 424 F.2d 697, 702-03 n.4 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970).
7 4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(b), 1973i(b) (1970). See also text accompanying notes
80-82 infra.
7 5 North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d at 562. After analyzing the language of
§ 1971(b) and concluding that it "performs the same function as § 203(c), and . . .
should be given the same effect," judge Sobeloff remarked that "[i]t is difficult to con-
ceive that Congress intended to place voting rights guarantees on a lower plane of pro-
tection than the right to equal public accommodations." Id. at 562 n.7.
76 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827 (1966).
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would have denied removal to the Peacock defendants if they had been
prosecuted for trespassing in the voting registrar's office-such an office
not being within the 1964 Civil Rights Act's definition of a "place of
public accommodations" 7 -- and had alleged that they had been at-
tempting to register at the time of their arrest and that they were being
prosecuted solely for that activity, activity within the protection of sec-
tion 1971(b).78 For this reason, and since the "attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce," language is broad enough to include state prose-
cutions, the difference in statutory language does not satisfactorily ac-
count for the divergent results in Rachel and Peacock.7"
A second line of analysis has been provided by the Fifth Circuit
which has read the Supreme Court cases in a manner that makes
Peacock a quirk rather than a precedent. That court has relied
on the timing of enactment, rather than the scope of the federal
statutes involved in Rachel and Peacock, as a means of distinguishing
the two cases.80 Its approach reads Rachel very broadly without at-
taching any inherent limitation to the immunization power of the "intim-
idate, threaten, or coerce" language present in section 1971(b). Judge
Tuttle, speaking for the court in Whatley v. City of Vidalia,8 1 noted
that section 1971(b) refers only to voters but the Peacock defendants
had alleged only that they were arrested for encouraging other persons
to register. Only after their petitions were filed and while their cases
were on appeal, did Congress enact section 1973i(b) as part of the
7742 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1970).
78 Cf. New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856
(1969).
79 Another question of statutory language arises when the petitioner relies on title I
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (1970). That statute provides criminal
penalties for "[w]hoever . . . by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates, or
interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with" any citizen because
of his exercise of certain rights including the right to apply for or enjoy employment.
Id. (emphasis added). The Second and Third Circuits have both held that prosecutions
which interfere with the exercise of this right to equal employment are not removable
because the term "force" in the statute limits its protection to physical violence, and
therefore does not protect against state prosecutions whatever the motive. New York
v. Horelick, 424 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970); Hill v. Penn-
sylvania, 439 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (alternative
holding).
judge Brown has strongly attacked this limited reading of the 1968 Act. For his
conclusion that "force" is a far broader term than "violence" he relies both on the legisla-
tive history of title I and "the fact that arrest, confinement and criminal prosecution are
all inherently coercive in nature (and therefore invariably entail utilization of 'threats of
force'). . . ." Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 40-41 (5th Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion). He goes on to state that
[t]o exclude harassing criminal prosecutions from the scope of § 245(b)'s
immunity simply because beatings and killings may have provided the primary
impetus for its enactment is to pay homage to the right while eviscerating the
remedy. The ultimate consequence of intimidation is the same, whether the
victim is in jail, in the hospital or in the grave.
Id. at 41.
8 0 Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1968) ; see Davis v. Alabama,
399 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1968). But cf. Perkins v. M~ississippi, 455 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1972).
After this Comment was set into print, the Fifth Circuit, upon rehearing en banc, reached
the same result as had the panel. Perkins v. Mississippi, No. 30,410 (Dec. 20, 1972)
(mem.).
81399 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Voting Rights Act of 1965, thereby extending protection to those helping
others to vote or register, as well as those who are themselves voting.
Consequently, the argument goes, the Supreme Court did not reach the
question of the prophylactic effect of statutory language prohibiting
any attempt to "intimidate, threaten, or coerce," since the petitioners'
conduct was not subject to federal statutory equal rights protection at
the time of their arrest.82 This line of analysis is clearly unacceptable
as a basis for distinguishing Rachel and Peacock since two factors
indicate that the majority did take section 1973i(b) into consideration.83
First, the same footnote which quotes the provisions protecting voters
in section 1971(b) also cites, without discussion, section 1973i(b).84
If this distinction was the basis for the Peacock decision, the Court's
citation to the statute at that point in the opinion, without further
explication, could only be interpreted as intentional obscurity. Second,
this argument proves far too much for it would have also resulted in
removal being denied in Rachel. The Rachel petitioners did not invoke
the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in their removal petition because that equal rights statute also had
not been enacted. It became law while the case was on appeal85 and the
Supreme Court applied its provisions to make a clear prediction that the
maintenance of a trial would violate the statute. If section 1973i(b)
could ever insulate the defendants in factual situations similar to Pea-
cock, then it would have permitted removal in Peacock itself, in the
same manner that section 2000a-2 required removal in Rachel. For at
the time the Peacock Court remanded to the state court for trial,
section 1973i(b) was in effect, and, under this analysis, should have
protected the Peacock defendants.
The Third Circuit has read Rachel very narrowly. Relying on
the fact that in Rachel the state criminal statute purported to punish
the same specific conduct which the federal statute claimed to protect,
while no such direct conflict occurred between the federal statute relied
upon by the Peacock defendants and the criminal statute under which
they were prosecuted, Judge Seitz stated:
The statutes relied upon in Rachel necessarily displaced
any state laws which would proscribe the act of remaining in
public accommodations when asked to leave on account of
race by prohibiting attempted punishment for this act. How-
ever, when statutes, such as those relied upon in Peacock,
grant one a right not to be intimidated for efforts to accomplish
a particular goal or while asserting a specific right, we cannot
ascribe to Congress an intent to displace state laws which
821d. at 522-24.
83 A third indication is that the dissent considered this statute. City of Greenwood
v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 847-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting, with whom Warren, CJ., and
Brennan & Fortas, 33., concurred).
84 384 U.S. at 811 n.3.
85 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 785 (1966).
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regulate one's conduct while attempting to exercise the right
unless, of course, the federal right permits specific acts which
are proscribed by state law, or the state law, in effect, fore-
closes a reasonable possibility of engaging in acts necessary to
assert the federal right.80
Thus, removal in the Third Circuit is determined primarily on the
basis of the statute which forms the basis of the state's charge. The
allegations of the removal petition are relevant on the question whether
remand is proper or a factual hearing should be held by the district
court only to the extent they allege improper motivation is present-
motivation which would bring the state statute into direct conflict with
the prophylactic federal civil rights statute.
In New York v. Davis,87 the Second Circuit distinguished Rachel
and Peacock in a similar manner. The court relied on the Supreme
Court's finding that no federal law conferred immunity from the gen-
erally applicable state criminal statutes involved in Peacock despite the
petitioner's allegations that the prosecutions were intended to interfere
with protected rights. Judge Friendly concluded:
The line is thus between prosecutions in which the conduct
necessary to constitute the state offense is specifically pro-
tected by a federal equal rights statute under the circum-
stances alleged by the petitioner, and prosecutions where the
only grounds for removal are that the charge is false and
motivated by a desire to discourage the petitioner from exer-
cising or to penalize him for having exercised a federal right.
... To apply this distinction requires the court to scrutinize
the state criminal statute and the charge thereunder as well as
the factual allegations in the removal petition, since removal
is not authorized if the petition simply denies facts that would
be essential to a conviction . . . and alleges improper moti-
vation. . . . Putting the matter in a slightly different way,
whereas the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had rendered Georgia's
refusal to leave on demand statute unconstitutional in cases
where the demand was racially motivated, the Fair Housing
Act has not rendered New York's "menacing" statute un-
constitutional simply because the defendant claims that the
prosecution is basely motivated and that he did not do what
has been charged.88
Thus the criminal charge and the supporting statute are also crucial
80Hill v. Pennsylvania, 439 F.2d 1016, 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971). In a recent case the Fourth Circuit adopted this same analysis. Frinks v. North
Carolina, 468 F.2d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The federal law [relied upon in
Rachel] invalidated the Georgia trespass statute, at least where the request to leave was
invidiously motivated, and substituted 'a right for a crime.' ") See North Carolina v.
Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
8 7 New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969).
88 Id. at 754. It is no longer clear that this is the Rachel-Peacock line in the Second
Circuit. See note 73 supra & accompanying text.
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considerations in the Second Circuit. This test focuses on the "conduct
necessary to constitute the state offense," and is therefore essentially
the same as that of the Third Circuit. 9 Only when, under the facts
of the case as indicated by the petitioner's allegations, the state criminal
statute will be brought into direct conflict with a "supreme" federal
equal rights statute, will a factual hearing be proper on motion to
remand. In all other situations remand to the state trial court will be
made without an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Brown, in a dissent,"' has expressed his belief that the key
to the cases is the statement in Peacock that removal could not be
sustained "upon the allegations of the petitioners in this case .... "I
Under this interpretation the Peacock defendants had not been entitled
to removal because they had failed to allege that they were being
prosecuted solely for their exercise of federally protected activity. Re-
moval was improper because under their allegations it was possible
that they were being prosecuted both for their protected activity and
for violating valid state statutes. Thus, Judge Brown would require
a factual hearing in the federal district court any time the defendant
alleged in his removal petition that he was being prosecuted exclusively
because of his exercise of federally protected rights.
There are several problems with this analysis. First, the removal
petitions of the second group of Peacock defendants, as quoted by the
Supreme Court, alleged that they were being prosecuted for the "sole
purpose and effect of harassing Petitioners and of punishing them for
and deterring them from the exercise of their constitutionally protected
right to protest the conditions of racial discrimination and segregation
.... 92 Secondly, this analysis relies totally on one phrase in Peacock,
without accounting for the remainder of the opinion.9" Thirdly, it as-
sumes that the reference to "upon the allegations" indicates that dif-
ferent factual allegations as to one particular fact was the cause of
the remand. But the Court's reference to the allegations does not
necessarily imply that its concern was with the facts alleged. This
reference to the allegations is equally consistent with the narrower
conclusions of the Second and Third Circuits. Since the conduct re-
8 9 The Second Circuit did leave some room for possible expansion in the Davis
decision. A footnote points out that the facts did not require the court to decide the
issue of "whether, despite what seems to be the contrary thrust of Peacock, a prosecution
may be removable under § 1443(1) if the defendant claims he was engaged in conduct
so closely related to that protected by the federal equal rights statute that the criminal
charges are only 'convenient tags.'" 411 F.2d at 754 n.4. See also note 73 supra & ac-
companying text.
9 0 Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 11 (5th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
91Id. at 26 (quoting City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827 (1966))
(emphasis omitted).
92 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 813 (1966); see id. at 828 ("If, as
they allege, they are being prosecuted on baseless charges solely because of their race,
then there has been an outrageous denial of their federal rights . . .
93 Id. at 826-27.
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quired for conviction on the state charge was not protected by a
federal statute,94 the petitioners' allegations were indeed insufficient,
but nothing they could have alleged under the circumstances would
have altered the Court's result. Finally, this analysis leads to a test at
variance with the Peacock Court's concerns about overburdening the
federal judiciary and increasing delay, and its desire not to repudiate the
teachings of the Strauder-Powers decisions.95
V. A BROAD TEST AND THE QUESTION OF CAUSATION
A civil rights worker attempting to integrate a public restaurant
is charged with assaulting the manager during that attempt. A black
person is charged with disturbing the peace a few minutes after he
left a restaurant which grudgingly served him food. Three days after
he attempted to gain service in a restaurant a black person is arrested
for speeding or bank robbery. Each of these people removes his case to
the federal district court alleging that he is being prosecuted solely
because of his exercise of federally protected rights. On the state's
motion to remand should the federal district judge hold a factual
hearing?
Under the test propounded by the Second and Third Circuits no
such question need be asked. Since the conduct necessary for con-
viction under the state statute is not specifically insulated by a federal
equal rights law (and since the state statute does not inherently fore-
close activity necessary for the assertion of a right under the federal
law), there are no factual questions to be resolved at a hearing, and
the district judge will remand to the state trial court.
But under any other reading of Rachel and Peacock this question
will inevitably arise. This is true even under Judge Sobeloff's analysis
that the cases are explained by the "attempt to punish" language present
in section 2000a-2 but not in section 1971(b) ." That approach limits
removal to cases in which the right exercised relates to public accommo-
dations, but it does not require the state criminal charge to be trespass
or the like. Rather, whatever the charge, if the defendant alleges that
the prosecution is actually for protected activity then a hearing is
necessary. 7 Similarly, under the explanations of Rachel and Peacock
offered by the Fifth Circuit in Whatley, and by Judge Brown's dissent,
these questions arise. They are essentially questions of causation, or,
regarding the question of whether an evidentiary hearing should be held,
a question as to the relationship between the state's criminal charge
and the federally protected activity engaged in by the defendant.
94 See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
95 See text accompanying notes 121-31 infra.
96 See notes 71-79 supra & accompanying text.
97 Frinks v. North Carolina, 468 F.2d 639, 647-48 (4th Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion); North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir.) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
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The only clear casees is one like Rachel in which the state statute
explicitly punishes an activity that is immunized from prosecution by
a federal equal rights statute under the facts alleged in the removal
petition. And it should not matter that the state specifically denies that,
for example, a request to leave was racially motivated. Even if the
state claims that the defendant was asked to leave because of his failure
to wear shoes, this is basically the motivation question on which the
Rachel Court ordered an evidentiary hearing. 9 For, under the facts of
the case as alleged in the removal petition, not only are the defendants
being harassed for their protected activity, but the state statute, by its
own terms, is in direct conflict with the federal statute.
The difficulties arise when the state and federal statutes do not
come into conflict but the defendant claims that he is being prosecuted
because of his protected activity.The strongest argument for removal
in such a case occurs where the defendant is in the process of exercising
his federal rights when he is arrested under a broad criminal statute
such as a vagrancy or disorderly conduct law. If Rachel is not to be
limited to its facts, this type of case presents the strongest arguments
for removal. First, the defendants are being prosecuted under a broadly
worded statute of a type which is easily used to harass. Removal is
particularly important for prosecutions under such statutes because it
is more likely that a prosecutor could successfully convince a jury that
the defendant's behavior was essentially "bad" and should be punished,
than that a jury would convict erroneously on a more specific-and
more serious--charge. Furthermore, a conviction on a general charge is
less likely to be reversed for insufficient evidence on appeal because the
reviewing court will be less able to look to one particular fact as the
basis for decision. 100 Second, although there is no accord between
the parties as to the basis for the arrest, the alleged protected activity
coincides with the time and place of arrest. This is not a situation where
the petitioner claims that his arrest was caused by his protected activity
earlier that day or some other day. Thus, if an evidentiary hearing is
held, it is not necessary to connect two seemingly unrelated events in
9 S The discussion in this section focuses on cases in which the defendant claims that
he is being prosecuted for activity protected by the "attempt to punish" language of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus removing the issue of what language is necessary in
federal equal rights statutes to immunize conduct from valid state criminal laws. See
notes 43-47 supra & accompanying text.
09 In Rachel the state did not specifically allege a different motive for the manager's
request that the defendants leave, but there were no stipulated facts, or specific acceptance
of the defendants' claim, and the Supreme Court treated it as a disputed question, order-
ing a hearing for the purpose of giving the defendants an "opportunity to establish that
they were ordered to leave the restaurant facilities solely for racial reasons." Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 805 (1966). See also New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 754 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969) (authorizing removal when "the conduct necessary
to constitute the state offense is specifically protected by a federal equal rights statute
under the circumstances alleged by the petitioner ... ." (emphasis added)).
100 Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 857-58 ("Where removal is most needed is
the case in which the impingement on federal rights is more subtle, more immune against
appellate correction.... ").
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order to show that the prosecution was an attempt to punish protected
activity.
In Achtenberg v. Mississippi the Fifth Circuit expounded on the
subject of broad state criminal statutes:
There is no magic in the word "trespass" as a basis for
limiting the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Rachel.
"Trespass" in Georgia is a broad enough charge to cover il-
legal entry on the property of another without regard to any
questions of race or color; or it could also cover merely the
refusals of a person to leave public accommodations because
of a policy of racial exclusion. The movants alleged in Rachel
that it was the latter. Thus that allegation, the Court held,
asserted a ground for removal, and that allegation must be
proven if challenged. So, too, the vagrancy statute may be a
convenient tag for the state of Mississippi to attach to this
conduct of these movants. 101
The concern of the court is to make it impossible for the state prosecutor
to defeat federal jurisdiction by the simple expedient of charging the
defendants with a crime other than trespass. 2 But this concern can
not be limited to prosecutions under broad criminal statutes such as
disorderly conduct and vagrancy. Prosecutors can also "attempt to
punish" civil rights activists by charging them with assault, possession
of a deadly weapon, or robbery. Thus the Fifth Circuit has not limited
civil rights removal jurisdiction to prosecutions under broadly defined
state statutes which easily afford the opportunity for abuse. That court
has consistently held that it is the petitioner's allegations that control,
and that, whatever the charge, if the petitioner alleges that he is actually
being prosecuted for federally protected activity an evidentiary hearing
is required; 0 3 petitioner's proof of his allegations will result in the
federal court retaining jurisdiction.
101 393 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1968). judge Godbold basically agreed with this
approach in his separate opinion:
The use of the label 'vagrancy' in the charges against them instead of the label
'trespass' does not require a result different than Rachel. The inquiry is to the
scope and character of the conduct engaged in by the accused, not to categoriza-
tions, accurate or inaccurate, given to that conduct in the making of the criminal
charges.
Id. at 476 (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In one case the Fourth Circuit indicated in dicta that it also would allow removal
in such cases if the conduct charged was of a nonviolent nature. South Carolina v. Moore,
447 F.2d 1067, 1070 (4th Cir. 1971). In a more recent case, however, the court adopted
the approach of the Second and Third Circuits, allowing removal only when, under the
allegations of the defendant, there is a direct conflict between the state and federal
statutes. Frinks v. North Carolina, 468 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1972) (2-1 decision). See
note 86 supra.
102 See Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 31 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, C.J., dissenting):
The punitive consequences of such ["attempted punishment"] prosecutions are
not alleviated simply because the defendant is maliciously charged with allegedly
unrelated criminal misconduct rather than the acts protected by Federal law.
The result in either case is the same: impermissible State interference with the
exercise of rights Congress has immunized against intimidation.
103 Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1969):
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This is not the end of the need for such an expansionary approach,
however, because the unscrupulous prosecutor could attempt to punish
the exercise of federal rights not only by altering the charge, but also by
postponing arrest until the termination of protected activity. Limiting
removal to cases where the petitioners allege that they were engaged
in protected activity at the time of arrest allows, in Judge Brown's
opinion, "effective vindication of Federal rights through the removal
remedy to be effortlessly circumnavigated by the simple expedient of
holding the spurious arrest in abeyance until after the right has been
exercised and the innocent defendant has begun to engage in 'unpro-
tected activity.' ",104 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has not limited
removal to those situations where the arrest was coterminous with the
protected activity. In Achtenberg all of the defendants but one were
arrested for vagrancy while sitting-in in the public library. 05 The last
defendant had left the library before the police arrived. Later that day
she was refused service at a restaurant. It was only after she left the
restaurant that she was arrested, also on a charge of vagrancy.' °6 In
allowing removal for all of the defendants, the Achtenberg majority
drew no distinction based on the time of arrest. Judge Godbold, however,
dissented with regard to that one defendant not arrested while within
the library:
On the particular day her presence on and movement about
the streets of Hattiesburg, and into and out of the library and
the stores, was close in time and in place with her efforts to
use the library and the restaurant facilities of the two stores.
But closeness or even concurrence is not the test-scope and
quality of conduct charged to be a violation of law, measured
against the four corners of conduct the exercise of which is
guaranteed by the 1964 Act, is the test....
It is what the movant was actually doing with respect to the exercise of his
statutory federally protected right, as determined in a hearing for remand, that
controls and not the characterization given to the conduct in question by a state
prosecutor ....
Accord, Walker v. Georgia, 405 F.2d 1191, 1192 (5th Cir. 1969); Whatley v. City of
Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7 (5th
Cir. 1972).
104 Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, CJ., dissenting).
judge Brown went on to say:
Under such a standard it would not be at all difficult to imagine the spectacle
of a Thomas Rachel or a Sandra Adickes, cowering inside the sheltered sanctity
of the restaurant or public library in the exercise of Federally protected rights,
yet afraid to step outside into the arms of police officers waiting around the
corner with trumped-up charges of vagrancy, bigamy or second-degree murder.
An interpretation of Peacock entailing such consequences carries its own re-
futation.
Id. at 32. The fact situation that judge Brown describes might, however, be a proper
one for federal injunctive relief. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
105393 F.2d at 469, 471.
106d. at 470.
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.. The relation of cause and effect between protected
civil rights activities of the Peacock petitioners and their
baseless arrest is not subject to rational doubt. But cause
and effect was rejected as the yardstick. Criminal charges are
not removable on the ground that they are baseless and made
to punish and deter exercise of protected rights. Charges are
removable if quantitatively and qualitatively they involve
conduct coterminous with activity protected under the Civil
Rights Act ... .07
Requiring, as has the Fifth Circuit, a hearing whenever a state criminal
defendant removes on the basis that he was arrested and is being prose-
cuted, not for the acts alleged in the criminal charge, but because of
unrelated civil rights activity, might greatly expand the possibility of
abuse of the civil rights removal statute,'0 8 and add to the congestion
in the federal courts, possibilities specifically avoided by the Peacock
Court. 09 Furthermore, it would expand the scope of the factual inquiry
which the district court must make on the motion to remand. The court
must determine whether two seemingly unrelated events are, in fact,
cause and effect. Judge Friendly has stated that "[w]hile Rachel does
entail in some instances a trial preliminary to the determination of
federal jurisdiction, this is on what the Court evidently considered to
be a rather narrow issue, whether the conduct charged is within the
area withdrawn by the federal statute from the ambit of allowable
state prosecution-not . . . on the very question that is the subject
of the state criminal charge."" 0
Thus, under any interpretation of Rachel and Peacock other than
one based on the nature of the state criminal statute and its potential
107 d. at 476-77 (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote
omitted).
108 See generally Comment, 6 U. SAN FRANcisco L. REv. 117 (1971). But cf. Amster-
dam, supra note 11, at 832.
1 09 See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 832-33 (1966). The policy
considerations articulated in Peacock are discussed at text accompanying notes 121-31
infra.
110 New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856
(1969). judge Brown has responded that
the argument that the distinction between Rachel and Peacock lies in the scope
of the evidentiary hearing necessary to determine whether Federal rights have
been violated by State criminal prosecutions overlooks entirely the fact that in
either case the ultimate issue is the same-the motivation for the proceedings.
Arrests and prosecutions arising from the peaceful attempts to gain service in
places of public accommodation (as in Rachel) do not automatically entitle a
defendant to remove his case to a Federal court. The petitioner must still allege
and prove that he was arrested and prosecuted only because he was a Negro.
Resolving such issues requires a factual inquiry no less extensive than that needed
to determine whether prosecutions for "unprotected" conduct are merely smoke-
screens for an officially sanctioned deprivation of federal rights.
Perkins v. Mfississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 32 (5th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion); see id. at
32-33 n.98.
This argument is too quick to dismiss the greater difficulty, and more complex
factual considerations, in proving motive by proving a cause and effect relationship
between two apparently unrelated events, than in dealing with only one event.
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conflict with a federal statute, it is necessary to either provide a hearing
for any defendant who alleges that he is being prosecuted solely because
of some protected activity or to draw some essentially arbitrary line
as to when a hearing should be required. Any line drawn would be
arbitrary because people can be harassed by prosecutions on any charge
and on charges brought at any time 11
VI. Rachel AD Peacock RECONSIDERED
The test espoused by the Second Circuit in New York v. Davis"12
best explains the different results in Rachel and Peacock and is most
consistent with the policies underlying those decisions. Judge Friendly
drew the line "between prosecutions in which the conduct necessary
to constitute the state offense is specifically protected by a federal equal
rights statute under the circumstances alleged by the petitioner, and
prosecutions where the only grounds for removal are that the charge is
false and motivated by a desire to discourage the petitioner from
exercising or to penalize him for having exercised a federal right."
113
Application of this test reaches the result of the Supreme Court in
Rachel and Peacock without relying on inferences from a single cita-
tion in a footnote" 4 or on a single sentence of the opinion," 5 in a
manner consistent with all of the language in PeacockY."
In Rachel the federal and state statutes both dealt with the same
conduct-the presence of one person on the property of another. If the
alleged motivation of the restaurant manager was present, then any
application of the state's trespass statute would run afoul of the Civil
Rights Act of 1966. Allowing removal under such circumstances extends
Strauder only slightly,117 since, as applied to defendants asked to leave
for racial reasons, the state statute is in direct conflict with the federal
law. This type of inevitable conflict does not occur in Peacock. The
federal right to help register voters does not undercut state public
safety laws concerning blocked streets, reckless driving, or assault.
Certainly the federal statute does not authorize murder, to choose an
111 See notes 101-07 supra & accompanying text.
112411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969) (discussed at notes
87-89 supra & accompanying text).
113 411 F.2d at 754.
114 See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
315 See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
116 See New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 753-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
856 (1969).
117 The Court was limiting its deviation from the established doctrine. Referring to
the Strauder-Powers decisions, the Court stated:
[We decline to repudiate those decisions, and we decline to do so not out of a
blind adherence to the principle of stare decsis, but because after independent
consideration we have determined . . . that those decisions were correct in their
basic conclusion that the provisions of § 1443(1) do not operate to work a
wholesale dislocation of the historic relationship between the state and the
federal courts in the administration of the criminal law.
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 831 (1966).
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extreme example, to be used by black persons in the implementation of
voting or public accommodations rights." 8 Admittedly, a black person
who has exercised his federal rights can be harassed by means of a
spurious murder charge. Even if an allegation of such harassment,
analogous to the petitioners' allegation in Peacock, is true, the state
criminal statute is not brought into conflict with the federal equal
rights statute. Rather, if the allegation is true, state officers are using
the statute in a manner prohibited by federal law. The Peacock Court
made it clear that section 1443 (1) was not the proper remedy for such
conduct." 9 Thus Rachel and Peacock are best explained by the fact
that in the former the truth of the petitioners' allegations would bring
the state criminal law into direct conflict with a federal statute providing
for equal rights, but in the latter no such conflict would arise. 2 ° This
interpretation not only best squares the two cases but also is responsive
to the policy considerations articulated in Peacock.
Two persistent policy considerations can be noted in the Supreme
Court's 1966 removal decisions. The Court did not want to place a
federal district judge in the position of being required to predict how
a particular federal claim would be received in the state courts,' 2'
and was reluctant to adopt an interpretation of section 1443 (1) which
would permit large numbers of criminal defendants to be able to force
their way, even temporarily, into the federal courts. 22
The first concern, based on considerations of federalism, 23 is best
assuaged by the establishment of a clear line between the removable
and the nonremovable state prosecution. For example, although federal
diversity jurisdiction is a product of the fear that state courts might be
prejudiced against nonresidents,2 4 removal pursuant to that jurisdic-
tional provision is automatic upon the allegation of diverse citizen-
ship. 28 That procedure is easily palatable to the states because the
existence of such a specific rule means that the federal court need not
118 See South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1971).
119 384 U.S. at 829-31.
120 A slight variation occurs when only one of the acts necessary for conviction under
the state criminal statute is protected by federal law. In one case the defendants were
prosecuted under the state's aggravated burglary statute, a charge which includes ele-
ments of both unauthorized entry and battery while on the premises. The defendant's
removal petition alleged that he had entered a restaurant in an attempt to gain service.
The Fifth Circuit held that remand without a hearing was improper because if the entry
had been peaceful, then one of the acts required for conviction under the criminal statute
was expressly authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, making the very act of prose-
cution a violation of federally protected rights. The court suggested that if violence had
occurred following a federally protected entry into the restaurant then the proper state
charge would be simple burglary. Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967).
12 1 See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 803-04 (1966) ; City of Greenwood v. Pea-
cock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966).
122 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 832 (1966).
12 3 See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 708, 803-04 (1966); cf. City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833-34 (1966).
12 4 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) ; United States
v. DeVeaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
1
2 5
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446-47 (1970).
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inquire whether the litigants could have their dispute decided impartially
in a particular state court. The rule established by the Strauder-Powers
decisions, requiring a facially unconstitutional state statute before a
prosecution could be removed, provided similar clarity.126
The other concern of the Court, based upon considerations of
federal judicial administration, is that an expansive interpretation of
section 1443 would produce a flood of civil rights removal petitions
requiring a substantial expenditure of time in the district courts devoted
to hearings on petitioners' allegations, and at the appellate level in the
review of remand orders. 127 This problem might develop if section 1443
was interpreted to require a factual determination by the district court
whenever the defendant alleges that he was arrested and charged with
an offense in reprisal solely because of his prior participation in pro-
tected activity. Hearings on such allegations, necessarily involving an
inquiry into the motives of the police in arresting the defendant, could
place a huge burden on the federal courts. The Peacock Court may,
however, have been overly concerned with this possibility. The Court's
analysis of the number of removal petitions filed ignores the fact that
the consolidation of large numbers of related petitions results in a far
smaller number of distinct cases actually taking up the time of the
federal courts. 2 Furthermore, the Court ignored the fact that the
choice is not one "between interlocutory federal litigation and no federal
litigation,"'" for an increase in the number of removed cases should
result in a significant, though not equivalent, 130 decrease in the number
of postconviction habeas corpus cases litigated in the federal courts.
And this latter form of federal interference in the state judiciary is of
a fundamentally more abrasive type because, rather than taking away
a case from the state judge before he has heard it and reached a decision,
it reverses him and requires that he retry the case or set the defendant
free. 13 Yet, exaggerated or not, the Supreme Court was clearly con-
cerned with the overburdening effects of an expanded removal jurisdic-
tion, and the lower federal courts must keep that concern in mind when
interpreting Rachel and Peacock.
These policies do not, however, satisfactorily account for the
different results in Rachel and Peacock. As the Fifth Circuit has pointed
out, 182 any type of criminal charge can be used to harass individuals
for the exercise of federally protected rights, thus punishing them
126 See Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 858.
1 2 7 See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 832-33 (1966); cf. id. at 834
(need for more judges).
128 See Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521, 522 n.1 (6th Cir. 1968).
129 Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 833.
130The decrease in habeas corpus cases and direct appeals to the Supreme Court
will not equal the number of cases removed because some trials held in the state courts
result in verdicts of not guilty precluding the need for any federal intervention.
131 See Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and the State Court Criminal Defendant, 19
VANa. L. Rrv. 741, 741 (1966) ; Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 835.
13 2 See notes 101-06 supra & accompanying text.
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unconstitutionally. If the Rachel defendants are to be given the op-
portunity to demonstrate that they are being prosecuted solely for
protected activity, the Peacock defendants should be given the same
opportunity. Regardless of the relationship between the state statute and
the federal statute, prosecutors can effectively inhibit the exercise of
federal rights by bringing baseless prosecutions. As has been indicated,
the Court was overly concerned about congestion of the federal courts.
And to the extent that congestion is a general problem in the federal
courts, it is not clear why it is civil rights removal jurisdiction which
should be sacrificed. To the extent delay is a problem, Congress can
require removal petitions to be filed within a specific time after the
onset of the prosecution, rather than allowing removal at any time
before the state trial. Thus the Court or Congress should reconsider
section 1443 (1) and require an evidentiary hearing in any removed
case in which the removal petition presents allegations sufficient to
indicate that the prosecution is solely motivated by a desire to punish the
defendant for his exercise of federally protected rights. The federal
district courts should have broad discretion to remand in any case as
soon as it becomes clear that the prosecution is not being used as a
means of unconstitutional punishment.
Section 1443(1) can provide an important safeguard if so inter-
preted. As Professor Amsterdam has stated:
[W] here the federal contention is that the activity underlying
the criminal charges is federally immune from state inhibition,
the importance and the practicability of preserving a role
for the state courts as federal law enforcers are considerably
diminished, and the countervailing need for interlocutory fed-
eral intervention considerably increased. If this sort of federal
immunity is to be made reasonably effective, the State must
eventually relinquish or be deprived of the power to begin
criminal proceedings which repress it. Arrest, charge, pretrial
detention, or release on bond to compel appearance for hearing
are effective methods of repression even where the charge is
dismissed or dropped at the first court appearance. These
repressive devices can be disarmed only if the state prosecutor
and the chief of police can themselves be brought into the
federal partnership, impressed with their responsibility for
the protection or at least the recognition of federal guarantees.
Ideally, the state justice of the peace or circuit judge might
impress them with this responsibility. But among state judges
he is the least likely and the least capable to do the job,
however prodded by his appellate superiors. The direct power
of the state appellate courts is limited in this regard, reaching
the prosecutor only some considerable time after he has se-
cured his conviction, and the police chief not at all. The likely
willingness of the state appellate courts to assume the function
is also limited: their judgments on particular federal issues
CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL
and the general sensitivity to federal rights which grows
out of the sum of particular judgments-and out of impres-
sions concerning the factual contexts in which federal rights
operate-are the creatures of cold records shaped by the state
trial courts. For these reasons it is dubious wisdom to look to
the state court system for efficient schooling of the prosecutor
and police chief in their federal responsibilities; the necessary
lesson can best be transmitted through the knowledge that
both may be required to appear in a federal district court,
at the outset of a prosecution, to justify the charges within
federal constitutional requirements. Federal anticipatory juris-
diction demands of the State's attorney that he think in terms
of federal law from the inception of proceedings, not merely
when he is called upon to sustain an easy conviction on appeal;
and it demands of the police chief that he appear and testify
before a court whose very authority in the case demonstrates
the immediacy of federal law. 8'
VII. AN OVER rEw
Under any of the suggested interpretations of Rachel and Peacock,
section 1443 (1) is not being used in a manner consistent with its title
as a removal statute. That term conjures up the image of a case first
brought in the state court, being transferred by the opposing party to
the federal court with the trial to follow in that latter forum. This
is what Congress envisioned in enacting a civil rights removal statute,'
and this is what occurs under sections 1441 and 1442, the other removal
provisions of title 28. Such a scenario can occur in a limited number of
cases removed under section 1443 (1) pursuant to the Strauder-Powers
decisions. When, as in Strauder, there is a state statute regulating trial
procedure which on its face deprives a class of citizens of rights
guaranteed by a federal statute providing for equal civil rights, the
federal district court, after making such a finding, should retain juris-
diction and try the case.""s If, however, it is the substantive criminal
provision under which the defendant is being prosecuted which on its
face contravenes a federal equal rights statute, then under Strander,
the same district court finding which establishes the propriety of the
removal will require the immediate granting of a defendant's motion
to dismiss the prosecution. 8 6
193 Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 837-38.
134 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 479, 1799 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Trumbull).
'8
5 Although this result seems clear, such a trial may never have been held. See text
accompanying note 139 infra. In the only Supreme Court decision ordering removal on
the basis of an unconstitutional procedural statute, the Court ordered a reversal of the
conviction but did not indicate that a new trial should be held in the federal court.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880).
130Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 852. For a discussion of the differences between
procedural and substantive claims under § 1443(1), see id. 852-62.
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And so it is with cases successfully removed pursuant to Rachel.
No matter which of the tests for removal under Rachel is adopted, a
factual determination that removal is proper can only be made when
the mere pendency of the prosecution results in a deprivation of
a right protected by a relevant federal statute. Here also, a defendant's
motion to dismiss will automatically be granted following removal.'
Thus under the Rachel extension of Strauder there are no circumstances
under which a state criminal trial will take place in a federal forum. 38
This result was clearly understood and expected by the Supreme Court,
for it posed the question: "If the removal jurisdiction is to be expanded
and federal courts are to try ... cases not originally cognizable in the
federal courts, what law is to govern, who is to prosecute, under what
law is a convicted defendant to be sentenced and to whose institution
is he to be committed ... ?,139
Thus, under Rachel and Peacock, "removal" is largely a misnomer
for section 1443 (1). A federal forum will not be provided because of
prejudice in the state forum. Rather, the statute as interpreted provides
a means by which the federal courts can limit the ability of state
prosecutors to harass individuals for their exercise of certain types of
federally protected rights. Thus section 1443(1) under Rachel and
Peacock is more akin to injunctive relief than to removal. Both federal
injunctions of pending state criminal trials and civil rights removal
followed by dismissal provide anticipatory relief for certain state defen-
dants. The standards for availability of the two remedies overlap but
are not contiguous.'40 The degree of overlap largely depends, of course,
137 In ordering a removal hearing, one court of appeals stated:
The judgment of remand is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court
with directions that the court conduct a bearing on the factual issue posed by the
motion to remand, that is to say, whether the entry made by [the defendant]
* ..was in the exercise of his right to enjoy equal access to a place of public
accommodations under Section 201 of the Civil Rights Act. If so, it will be the
duty of the district court to proceed to a disposition of the state prosecution
for aggravated burglary. Since a determination by the trial court on the remov-
ability question if in favor of removal, would eliminate one of the ingredients
of the state offense, then, of course, there would be nothing left for the United
States District Court to do but to dismiss the state charge.
Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 927, 929 (5th Cir. 1967).
138 Under any of the tests the district court, in order to sustain removal, must find
that the defendant is being prosecuted solely because of protected activity. Thus dismissal
follows immediately.
139 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833-34 (1966) (quoting Baines v.
City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 768-69 (4th Cir.), aff'd nert., 384 U.S. 890 (1966)).
140 The relative degree of irritation to the state judiciary resulting from these two
means of federal pre-trial relief is unclear. The American Law Institute has concluded:
An injunction is a far more delicate remedy than removal, since an injunc-
tion will issue only after a judicial determination of irreparable harm, while
removal automatically brings the state proceedings to a halt unless the case is
remanded. It is of less importance that a properly restricted formula be devised
if injunction, rather than removal, is contemplated, since the formula will be ap-
nlied initially by a federal judge in the case of an injunction, and is not mechan-
ically applicable as it would be with removal. There are certainly circumstances
in which an injunction can issue without requiring the federal courts to pre-
judge their brethren of the state judiciary.
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on which interpretation of Rachel and Peacock is adopted. But regard-
less of that choice, section 1443 (1) is clearly available only to defen-
dants prosecuted for the exercise of rights provided by federal equal
rights statutes. It does not provide any remedy for the defendant who
is prosecuted for his free speech or other exercise of general rights.""
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the history and terminology of section 1443 (1), Rachel
and Peacock make it clear that that statute is not truly a removal
statute. Rather, section 1443 (1) provides another means whereby the
federal courts can intervene in state court proceedings and cause an
immediate dismissal of the criminal prosecution. And, interpreted in
a manner most consistent with Rachel and Peacock, civil rights removal
is limited even in this scope to the situation where, under the facts
alleged and proven by the defendant, the state criminal statute itself
comes into direct conflict with a federal statute providing for equal
civil rights. Thus, Congress' decision in 1964 to "allow the courts to
deal case by case with situations as they arise,"" rather than amending
section 1443, results in a civil rights removal statute which is largely
a phantom. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute in a manner
that expands Strauder only slightly, and in decisions that have led to
great confusion in the lower federal courts. If removal is to have a real
function, the Supreme Court must reconsider its decisions and allow
defendants the opportunity to prove in federal court that, whatever the
charge, they are being prosecuted solely because of their exercise of
federal rights. In the alternative, if Congress truly desires to provide
a federal forum for certain classes of criminal prosecutions or certain
classes of defendants, it is incumbent on it to answer the questions posed
by the Peacock Court143 and to define specifically the appropriate cases
for removal.
§ 1312(c), comment at 206 (1969). Professor Currie has responded by asking: "isn't it
doubtful that state judges would be more irritated by the everyday process of removal
than by the extraordinary remedy of injunction?" D. CURRM, FMERAL CouRTs 609
(1968). This question fails to distinguish between the common forms of removal and the
equally "extraordinary" civil rights removal.
14 1 See notes 43-46 supra & accompanying text.
142 110 CoNG. Ric. 6956 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dodd).
143 Text accompanying note 139 supra.
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